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Abstract
The recent explosion of false claims in social
media and on the Web in general has given
rise to a lot of manual fact-checking initia-
tives. Unfortunately, the number of claims that
need to be fact-checked is several orders of
magnitude larger than what humans can han-
dle manually. Thus, there has been a lot of
research aiming at automating the process. In-
terestingly, previous work has largely ignored
the growing number of claims about images.
This is despite the fact that visual imagery
is more influential than text and naturally ap-
pears alongside fake news. Here we aim at
bridging this gap. In particular, we create a
new dataset for this problem, and we explore
a variety of features modeling the claim, the
image, and the relationship between the claim
and the image. The evaluation results show
sizable improvements over the baseline. We
release our dataset, hoping to enable further re-
search on fact-checking claims about images.
1 Introduction
As social media become a bigger part of our daily
lives, their influence over the way people think and
make decisions increases. Inevitably, this has of-
fered opportunities for fake content to arise and to
spread faster than ever, e.g., recent research has
shown that fake news spreads six time faster than
real news (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Sometimes such
content is created for pure entertainment or for fi-
nancial gain from advertisement shown alongside
the fake content, but more often and especially re-
cently it has been used to spread disinformation,
e.g., with the aim to influence political elections
(Atanasov et al., 2019). To deal with the prob-
lem, a number of manual fact-checking initiatives
have been launched, but they remain insufficient
to cope with the ever growing number of check-
worthy claims. Thus, automated methods have
been proposed as a more scalable solution.
(a) A series of images show
a Tesla vehicle in space.
(b) Photograph shows a fire
rainbow over Idaho.
Figure 1: Examples of Real images and True claims.
Recently, a growing number of claims have
been about images. The word Fauxtography has
been used to describe images, especially news
photographs, that convey a questionable, or out-
right false, sense of the events they seem to depict.
The term was coined over a decade ago (Cooper,
2007), and there is growing research interest in the
topic in the Computer Vision community (Bayar
and Stamm, 2016; de Carvalho et al., 2016). Given
the recent proliferation of fake news, and given
that many of the questionable claims are about im-
ages, it would be natural to expect similar interest
in the Computational Linguistics community, es-
pecially given the fact that visual imagery is more
influential than text and naturally appears along-
side fake news. Yet, computational fact-checking
has mostly ignored the growing number of claims
about images. Here we aim at bridging this gap.
In particular, we create a new dataset for this prob-
lem, and we explore a variety of features modeling
the claim, the image, and the relationship between
the claim and the image.
Let us look at some examples. Figure 1 shows
two images that look surrealistic, and thus spark
interest and raise natural suspicion. Yet, they are
in fact real.1,2
1http://www.snopes.com/fact-check/
tesla-car-really-space
2http://www.snopes.com/fact-check/
fire-rainbow
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(a) A photograph shows a
mountain resembling a tur-
tle.
(b) A photograph shows
Russian president Vladimir
Putin aggressively pulling
on U.S. president Barack
Obama’s tie.
Figure 2: Examples of Fake images and False claims.
Figure 2 contains fake images accompanied by
false claims. On the left, in Figure 2a, we see an
image from a Facebook page that claims to show
a turtle mountain. It turns out that this is not a
genuine photograph of a real-world location, but
a digital artwork comprising altered versions of
at least two different photographs.3 On the right,
Figure 2b displays an image purportedly showing
Putin aggressively grabbing President Obama by
the tie and pulling him close. This image has been
digitally manipulated.4
Finally, Figure 3 shows original photographs
with false claims about them. The image in Fig-
ure 3a shows Trump with his fists in the air, but
his gesture is not a greeting to a cancer victim as
the claim states. The real image was used as a part
of a meme5 that was designed to make it seem that
way. The photo in Figure 3a was posted by a Twit-
ter account in an attempt to go viral, claiming that
it shows a real bunny sitting in the palm of some-
one’s hand. It actually shows a plush doll.6
As we have seen above, there are a number of
reasons why an image may be deemed fake. In
most cases, this involves some kind of digital ma-
nipulation, e.g., cropping, splicing, etc. However,
there are cases when an image is completely legit-
imate, but it is published alongside some text that
does not reflect its content accurately. This is our
main focus here: we study the factuality of image-
claim pairs.
3http://www.snopes.com/fact-check/
turtle-mountain-photo/
4http://www.snopes.com/fact-check/
putin-obama-tie-pull/
5http://www.snopes.com/fact-check/
trump-fistpump-cancer-greeting/
6http://www.snopes.com/fact-check/
bunny-toy-photograph/
(a) President Trump’s notorious
‘fist pump’ at a Pennsylvania
airport on 9/11 was offered as a
greeting to a cancer victim.
(b) A photograph shows
a palm-sized rabbit.
Figure 3: Examples of True images and False claims.
The contributions of this paper can be summa-
rized as follows:
• We study a new problem: predict the factual-
ity of a claim with respect to an image.
• We create a new dataset for this problem,
which we release to the research community
in order to enable further work.
• We explore a variety of features, and we
demonstrate sizable improvements over the
baseline.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 presents some relevant related
work. Section 3 describes in depth our method and
the various features we experimented with. Sec-
tion 4 gives details about the datasets we created
and used. Section 5 describes our experimental
setup and presents the evaluation results. Section 6
gives additional details about the performance of
the individual features, both in isolation and in
various combinations, and further describes some
unsuccessful attempts at extracting better features.
Finally, Section 7 presents our conclusions and
some ideas for future work.
2 Related Work
2.1 Fact-checking Claims
There has been a lot of research in the last few
years in automatic fact-checking of claims and ru-
mors, which can be classified into two general cat-
egories. The first approach focuses on the social
aspects of the claim and how users in social me-
dia react to it (Canini et al., 2011; Castillo et al.,
2011; Ma et al., 2016; Zubiaga et al., 2016; Ma
et al., 2017; Dungs et al., 2018). This is reflected
by user comments, likes/dislikes, views and other
types of reactions, which are collected and used as
features.
Other methods use the Web and try to find in-
formation that proves or disproves the claim
(Mukherjee and Weikum, 2015; Popat et al., 2017;
Karadzhov et al., 2017; Mihaylova et al., 2018;
Baly et al., 2018b). In either case, what is impor-
tant is the stance (Riedel et al., 2017; Thorne et al.,
2017; Hanselowski et al., 2018; Mohtarami et al.,
2018, 2019): whether the opinion expressed in a
tweet or in an article by a particular user/source
agrees/disagrees with the claim, and the reliability
of the source, i.e., can we trust this source (Baly
et al., 2018a, 2019).
We should note that all these approaches are
limited to textual claims, while we are interested
in claims about images.
2.2 Detecting Fake/Manipulated Images
The task of detecting fabricated images falls under
the area of image forensics. Such tasks are usually
solved using traditional statistical methods mod-
eling color, shape, and texture features (Bayram
et al., 2006; Stamm and Liu, 2010; de Carvalho
et al., 2016). More recently, with the rise of
Deep Learning, modern approaches and architec-
tures have been applied to tackle the problem (Ba-
yar and Stamm, 2016). However, most existing
work uses datasets with generic images and very
few papers specialize in the area of news and so-
cial media (Jin et al., 2016). Detecting manipu-
lation in the images is relevant for us, but is not
enough, since often the image is original, but the
claim about it is false.
2.3 Fact-Checking Claims about Images
Little research exists on the topic of fact-checking
claims about images, where the input to be an-
alyzed is an image-claim pair. To the best of
our knowledge, there is only one work closely re-
lated to ours: a recent paper (Zhang et al., 2018)
presents a system called FauxBuster which aims to
fight against Fauxtography. We differ from them
in that we use the Web as a source of information.
In contrast, they focus on the social aspects of the
problem and use comments on Twitter and Reddit
to extract features, which makes our work com-
plementary to theirs. Unfortunately, direct com-
parison to their approach is not feasible, as their
dataset is not freely accessible.
3 Method
This section describes the different approaches we
applied towards engineering and extracting fea-
tures from the image-claim pair.
We start with reverse image search. The classi-
cal image search allows users to search for images
based on a text with specific words or phrases. In
contrast, reverse image search takes as input an
image and returns Web pages that include this ex-
act image or images that are very similar to it. This
process can be easily automated and applied to a
large number of images via Google’s Vision API.7
It can also return other information related to the
image, e.g., tags, the text on the image, some ob-
ject detection, explicit content, etc.
Using reverse image search, for each image we
obtain a maximum of 50 Web pages that con-
tain it. We remove pages that are known to be
from fact-checking Web sites such as snopes.com,
factcheck.org, using open-source code.8 For the
remaining Web pages, we crawl the article and we
get its title and text.
3.1 Features about the Image
Google tags: This is a list of tags that Google as-
sociates with the image. We decided to use this list
because it contains words and phrases about events
and people related to the image, which might give
us an insight about what the image contains and
what it is about. For example, the image in Fig-
ure 1a has the following tags: SpaceX, Falcon
Heavy, Rocket, Rocket launch, Falcon, Company,
Launch pad, Booster, Thrust, Entrepreneur, Elon
Musk. After lowercasing them and removing stop
words, we use them directly as bag-of-words fea-
tures.
URL domains: The Web pages that contain
the image usually come from media sources and
represent articles on a topic related to the image
and/or the claim attached to it. However, in some
cases they might point to an image-hosting ser-
vice or a social network Web site such as Pinterest,
Imgur, Twitter, etc. In an effort to use this fact, we
extracted the top-level domain names from the list
of URLs and we used them as TF.IDF features.
URL categories: In order to get more insight
about what types of websites write about fake and
genuine images, we classify them in several pre-
defined URL categories.
7http://cloud.google.com/vision/
8github.com/clef2018-factchecking
We use open-source code9 to classify URLs,
which performs rule-based matching of tokens
from the URL against a predefined list of words.
Given a URL, it assigns it a tuple of one higher-
level and one lower-level category. For example,
when we run the algorithm on the Web sites re-
turned for the image in Figure 1a we get category
tuples such as: (‘arts & entertainment’, ‘general’),
(‘sports’, ‘general’), (‘society’, ‘general’), (‘tech-
nology & computing’, ‘general’), (‘science’, ‘gen-
eral’), (‘automotive’, ‘general’) and (‘business’,
‘marketing’). To transform those into features, we
take all Web sites returned by the reverse image
search for the image, and we merge the lists of
their category tuples. We do not differentiate be-
tween high- and low-level categories; rather, we
just apply TF.IDF on the combined list.
True/False/Mixed media percentage: In order
to determine whether an image is fake or not, we
can also check the reliability of the sources that
wrote about it. Media Bias/Fact Check10 (MBFC)
is a Web site that provides factuality information
about 2700+ media sources. We use their database
to classify each Web page that is returned by the
reverse image search into the following categories:
True (high factuality), False (low factuality) and
Mixed (mixed factuality). Then, we use the per-
centage of Web pages from each category returned
by the reverse image search as a feature.
Known media percentage: If a URL is not on
the MBFC list, we label it as Unknown and we use
the percentage of known Web pages as a feature.
True/False/Mixed media titles: We use the ti-
tles of the articles from a True, False or Mixed me-
dia as bag-of-words features.
3.2 Features about the Claim
So far, in our feature extraction process we have
only used the image from the image-claim pair,
which means we might be missing crucial infor-
mation. After manual inspection of a few exam-
ples, we realized that about half of them can be
classified only using the image, e.g., because it is
a collage, was photoshopped, or manipulated in
some way. The other half contain legitimate im-
ages that might appear on trustworthy Web sites,
but the claim associated with them was false.
Claim text: We transform the text of the claim
into a TF.IDF vector, which we use as a feature.
9http://github.com/matthewruttley/
mozclassify
10http://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
3.3 Features about the Image-Claim pair
In addition to using the claim text, we want to
check how it is related to the image and whether
the claim is true with respect to it. We model that
by comparing the text of the claim to the articles
returned by the Reverse Image Search of the im-
age. We use only the articles from trustworthy me-
dia sources, according to our MBFC labels. We
approach the task of computing the similarity of
those texts in two different ways.
Cosine similarity: We perform the compari-
son on the TF.IDF representations of the claim and
each article’s title. We compute a smoothed aver-
age on the list of cosine similarities to get the final
feature value.
Embedding similarity: We use pretrained em-
beddings of size 512 (Cer et al., 2018) as a way to
vectorize the claim and the title sentences. Then, it
is trivial to calculate the similarity as a dot product,
as they are already in a normalized form. Again,
we use a smoothed average to reduce the list of
similarities to a single number.
4 Data
As we have a new task, we needed to create our
own dataset. In fact, we created two datasets from
two separate sources, but with similar qualities and
format. The main idea behind the data collec-
tion process was to find viral, interesting and even
contradictory images with some text that describes
them, i.e., the claim. Both datasets are in English.
4.1 The Snopes Dataset
Snopes.com is arguably the oldest and the largest
fact-checking Web site online. It aims to fight
misinformation by investigating different pieces of
news. The site has a special section for image-
related fact-checking, called Fauxtography11. It
uses an extensive list of labels to classify each
piece of news as True, False, Miscaptioned, Mix-
ture, Undetermined, Unproven, Outdated, etc. For
the purpose of our dataset, we gather only image-
claim pairs that were labeled as either True or
False. The collected data consists of 838 exam-
ples of which 197 True and 641 False. The huge
imbalance of the classes might be surprising at
first, but it makes sense for fact-checkers to pre-
fer to spend their time fact-checking news pieces
that have a higher chance of being fake.
11http://www.snopes.com/fact-check/
category/photos
(a) South Korean President
Moon Jae-in and North Ko-
rean leader Kim Jong Un
shake hands at the truce vil-
lage of Panmunjom inside
the demilitarized zone sepa-
rating the two Koreas.
(b) Lava erupts from a fis-
sure east of the Leilani Es-
tates subdivision during on-
going eruptions of the Ki-
lauea Volcano.
Figure 4: Examples of image-claim pairs from The
Reuters Dataset.
Yet, this lack of True-labeled examples can pose
some challenges for classification models and the
evaluation process as well. This is why we de-
cided to invest some time in gathering more True
examples as we explain below.
4.2 The Reuters Dataset
At the end of each year, Reuters publishes a list of
about 100 photos, called Pictures of the Year. Con-
veniently for us, each photo comes with a short
textual description, which we can use as a claim.
We collected all of these pictures from four con-
secutive years: 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. As a
result, we ended up with a total of 395 True image-
claim pairs. Some examples are shown in Fig-
ure 4. We further performed close manual inspec-
tion, and we did not find any obvious differences
between these images compared to the ones from
The Snopes Dataset. In terms of the claim, texts
from Reuters seem to be longer, but this should
not be a problem, since we do not use the length
as a feature.
5 Experiments and Evaluation
5.1 Setup
Note that the above two datasets contain 1,233
examples combined, and these examples are rel-
atively well-balanced: 592 True and 641 False.
As this is a small size, we chose to test the per-
formance of the models using cross-validation. If
we mix the data from the two sources having in
mind that the Reuters dataset has examples from
the True class only, we fear that the models might
implicitly learn each example’s source, not its fac-
tuality. Hence, we designed the following two
cross-validation experiments:
Testing on Snopes-only data. Ten times, using
a different random seed, we do the following:
1. Randomly choose 50 True and 50 False
Snopes examples and use them as a test set.
2. Use the rest of the True Snopes data plus all
Reuters data as True training examples.
3. Randomly sample the necessary number of
examples from the False Snopes data, so that
the training set is balanced.
Finally, we compute the average of the evalua-
tion measures for all ten folds.
Testing on Snopes + Reuters data. Ten times,
using a different random seed, we perform the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Combine all Snopes and Reuters data into a
single dataset.
2. Balance the resulting dataset by randomly
choosing the necessary number of False ex-
amples.
3. Do a random train-test split, so that the test
set contains 100 examples.
As in the previous experiment, we compute
the average of the evaluation measures for all ten
folds.
5.2 Classification model
We used a Linear SVM with the default value of
C=1. We trained a separate SVM model for each
feature type, then we applied a softmax to normal-
ize the values, and finally we averaged the confi-
dences of the classifiers to make the final decision.
5.3 Results
We used the following evaluation measures:
• Accuracy, because the classes are balanced,
and the majority-class baseline for all experi-
ments is 50.0.
• Average Precision, since it is useful if we
want to have a ranking task, e.g., to priori-
tize which claims about images human fact-
checkers should check first. Again, the ran-
dom baseline for all experiments is 50.0.
Feature Acc (S) AP (S) Acc (S+R) AP (S+R)
All 63.2 73.0 80.1 90.3
True media percentage 62.1 59.3 74.6 69.8
Embedding similarity of claim & true media titles 61.1 62.5 74.0 69.0
Cosine similarity of claim & true media titles 61.1 58.4 73.8 69.0
Known media percentage 60.4 58.6 74.6 71.9
URL domains 60.3 67.3 78.6 89.7
Google tags 58.5 63.9 71.5 82.1
Mixed media percentage 58.0 56.1 62.4 60.8
Claim text 57.1 60.8 74.9 83.8
True media titles 55.8 63.1 73.6 81.4
Mixed media titles 55.4 58.5 63.1 67.2
URL categories 53.7 56.0 70.3 76.2
False media titles 50.3 50.8 50.6 50.4
False media percentage 49.9 51.1 50.4 50.4
Baseline 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Table 1: Accuracy and Average Precision for individual feature types, calculated using 10-fold cross-validation
using the Snopes dataset (S), and the Snopes+Reuters dataset (S+R).
Table 1 illustrates the importance of each fea-
ture type in isolation. We can see that almost all
individual feature types manage to outperform the
two 50% baselines. The only weak features are
those related to false sources of information: per-
centage of unreliable media writing about the im-
age and the words used in the titles of the articles.
Moreover, using all features (with a model com-
bination as explained above) works best: 63.2%
and 80.1% Accuracy, 73.0% and 90.3% Average
Precision for S and S+R, respectively. The top-3
feature types for the Snopes test set are true me-
dia percentage (62.1% for S and 74.6% for S+R),
embedding similarity (61.1% for S and 74.0%
for S+R), and cosine similarity (61.1% for S and
73.8% for S+R). In either experiment, Average
Precision is higher than Accuracy. Larger im-
provements are achieved for the Snopes + Reuters
test set, which could be due to the model making
more mistakes on the True examples from Snopes
and being better on True examples from Reuters.
Figure 5 shows combinations of the top-n fea-
tures using each feature’s performance in terms
of Average Precision. Note that these top fea-
tures for the two experiments are different: we use
the scores in the AP(S) column in Table 1 for the
Snopes dataset, and the AP(S+R) column for the
Snopes+Reuters dataset. We can see that selecting
the top 4 to 5 features works best, yielding 65.4%,
75.1%, 84.1% and 92.5%.
Note that the Average Precision scores are
higher than those for Accuracy, and the scores for
the Snopes+Reuters dataset are higher.
6 Discussion
6.1 Most Important Individual Features
Above, we explored the performance of individ-
ual feature groups. Here we try to understand
what the most important individual features are.
For this purpose, we trained a model on all fea-
tures, and then we analyzed the weight of each fea-
ture in this full model. Note that this is different
from the setup in the previous section, where we
trained a separate model for each feature group,
and then we combined the predictions of these
models in an ensemble; in contrast, here we just
put all features from all groups together. The re-
sults are visualized in Figure 6. We can see that
some of them seem random, e.g., adventures of
huckleberry fin or everything trump touches dies.
However, there are a few that signal false infor-
mation, e.g., words like fake and viral mentioned
in the title of a trustworthy medium, or tags like
hoax and fact-checking. The existence of images
in the dataset that were modified for artistic pur-
poses can explain tags such as art and film. Also,
according to our best features, we should not trust
much images that appear on Twitter or ones related
to sensitive topics like african americans or islam.
Figure 5: Accuracy and Average Precision on 10-fold cross-validation using top-n features.
Figure 6: The most informative features: 20 positive
and 20 negative. Prefixes indicate feature types.
6.2 What Did Not Work
Metadata from images: In an attempt to capture
possible manipulation of the input image, we gath-
ered meta information using an open-source tool12
for image forensics. The tool extracts metadata in
the form of about 100 features such as size, reso-
lution, GPS location. However, most of this meta-
data turns out to be missing from our images: only
five features could be extracted for more than half
of the images from the Snopes dataset.
Image Splice Detection: As we have already
mentioned, one of the reasons why an image could
be fake is that it has been digitally manipulated.
A common manipulation is splicing, i.e., cropping
and stitching together parts of the same image or
multiple different images. We explored an ap-
proach that looks for the lack of self-consistency
in images and outputs clusters of the predicted im-
age parts using two algorithms: MeanShift and
DBSCAN (Huh et al., 2018). An illustration on
how it works is shown in Figure 7. We decided to
validate the method by using a pretrained model,13
which we applied to some images from the Snopes
dataset that were obvious cases of splicing.
12http://github.com/redaelli/
imago-forensics
13http://github.com/minyoungg/
selfconsistency
Figure 7: Predicted clusters for one of the images in
the Self-Consistency paper. Keanu Reeves has been
spliced into the photo and his body was separated cor-
rectly by both MeanShift and DBSCAN.
Figure 8: Predicted clusters for one of the images in
the Snopes Dataset. The original image depicts an ele-
phant; the lion and the cub have been photoshopped on
top (Source). The clustering algorithms did not detect
this splicing.
Unfortunately, this seemed not to work for us.
Figure 8 shows an example where the model could
not find the spliced regions. Eventually, we aban-
doned this direction as the inference time and the
required resources were significant, and the per-
formance was not very good on our dataset.
Error Level Analysis: Error Level Analysis
(ELA) helps to identify areas within an image that
are at different compression levels. With JPEG
images such as the ones in our Snopes and Reuters
datasets, the entire image should be at roughly the
same level. If a section of the image is at a signif-
icantly different error level, this would indicate a
likely digital modification.
ELA works by intentionally resaving the image
at a known error rate such as 95%, and then com-
puting the difference between the images. If there
is virtually no change, then the cell has reached its
local minima for error at that quality level. How-
ever, if there is a large change, then the pixels are
not at their local minima and are effectively origi-
nal. This method can be used to identify splicing,
because stitched regions will appear brighter on
the ELA version of the image. This is illustrated
in Figure 9. After manual inspection of ELA ver-
sions of images from our dataset, we did not find
the method to be very promising, see Figure 10.
Figure 9: One of the ELA examples on http://
fotoforensics.com. The part of the image with a
floppy disk appears brighter on the ELA map, as it was
spliced on top of the original.
Figure 10: ELA applied to one of the images from the
Snopes dataset. The spliced regions, i.e., the lion and
the cub, could not be identified.
6.3 Testing on New Data
All of the experiments described so far were per-
formed on claim-image pairs from Snopes that
were published in the period between November
20, 2000 and February 1, 2019. The data from
February up until April 29, 2019 has been left un-
touched, which makes it suitable for performing
one final test of the developed system. In these
three months, 64 articles were published in the
Fauxtography section, of which 14 were labeled as
True and 25 as False. To balance this new test set,
we subsampled 14 False examples randomly. The
training was performed on all previously collected
data from Snopes and Reuters, balanced in the
same way. For better certainty of the performance,
we sampled randomly the training and the test sets
ten times, and we report the average scores.
The results when using the top features based
on the Average Precision for the Snopes dataset
are shown in Table 2. We can see that the best
Average Precision is achieved by using the single
top feature of URL domains: 71.7%. When we
add to this the second best one, i.e., the Google
tags, we get an Accuracy of 64.3%. The scores of
the models that use more than three features are
not displayed since they were not as good.
The best-performing features across the exper-
iments differ, but as Table 1 shows, the URL do-
mains are top-1 in three out of four experiments,
and claim text is top-2 in two out of four experi-
ments.
Features Acc AP
All 59.3 69.7
Top 1 62.9 71.7
Top 2 64.3 70.4
Top 3 57.5 70.6
Baseline 50.0 50.0
Table 2: Accuracy and Average Precision on the New
test dataset.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented our efforts towards fighting
Fauxtography, namely detecting fake claims about
images, which is an under-explored research di-
rection. In particular, we created a new dataset
for this problem, and we explored a variety of fea-
tures modeling the claim, the image, and the rela-
tionship between the two. The evaluation results
have shown sizable improvements over the base-
line. We release our dataset,14 hoping to enable
further research on fact-checking claims about im-
ages.
In future work, we plan to extend the dataset
with more examples, to try other features,
e.g., from social media and from metadata,15 and
to adapt the system to work with other languages.
We further plan experiments with fact-checking
claims about videos.
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